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ABSTRACT
Kornai (2014) described the problems of municipal indebtedness in Hungary and analysed the process of
bailout carried out between 2011 and 2014. In the same period, the central government also reformed the local
government system, which included serious limitations of their financial independence. This study re-examines
the state of the soft budget constraint (SBC) of Hungarian local governments. To start, the general theoretical
framework of SBC is introduced. Then, the budget constraint on the Hungarian local governments before the
bailout is described briefly, followed by an assessment of the corresponding measures which were expected to
offset the negative messages of the completed bailout and to harden the budget constraint. The study concludes
that the central government decided to harden the budget constraint through the introduction of new hier-
archical mechanisms, while the development of fiscal discipline stopped. On the one hand, this resulted in the
consolidation of municipal budgets, but on the other, it was accompanied by a serious limitation of local
autonomy, projects and borrowing in general, while the central government employs specific administrative
tools to show favour to some settlements according to its (political) interests.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The financial management of local governments in Hungary was ripe for a large-scale reform by
the beginning of the 2010s. Renowned specialists and researchers have often pointed out that the
local government system is under significant stress. Its perhaps most conspicuous sign was the
very fast growth of municipal debt. The reasons were diverse. According to Vigvari (2010),
central politics considered local governments to be ‘conflict containers’ up until 2010 and tried to
delegate all issues involving political risks to these lower levels. The relief valve of the overpressure
brought about by the simultaneously appearing operating deficit and the expansion drive was the
high degree of freedom of local governments on money and capital markets even by the Western
European standards. This delayed the adjustment of budgetary expenditures to revenues and real
capabilities. In addition, due to the weaknesses of the institutional framework, fundraising from
external sources by local governments was controlled only by the willingness of the banks to lend
and take risks. The fundamentals of fiscal discipline were missing, including the fact that local
governments and later also the banks believed (in spite of the relevant clear legal rule) that the
central government will never release the hands of large local governments. And so it happened:
simultaneously with the transformation of the statutory foundations of the sector, the central
government set about assuming municipal debt and simply deleting the memento of the guilty
past. Apparently, there were only winners in the process: in the short term, the benefactor
government saved the troubled local governments and, starting from a clean slate, the local
governments can continue performing local public affairs. However, this simplified narrative
conceals a number of effects and consequences. The municipal debt consolidation is undoubtedly
the strongest indication in the past 20 years of the fact that the budget constraint of local gov-
ernments is soft: the expectation of being bailed out may determine the decisions of local gov-
ernments in the long term and may encourage them to continue overspending. The central
government had to act in order to harden the budget constraint and to consolidate the financial
management of local governments in order to avoid the reproduction of outstanding debt. The
central government planned to achieve this goal by introducing administrative controls into the
financial management of the local governments instead of promoting fiscal discipline and
strengthening the corresponding institutions (e.g. the municipal debt settlement procedure).
This study examines whether the legislative measures achieved the objectives set, together
with further consequences of the reform, which has not been analysed in detail in the literature.
Introducing the concept of soft budget constraint (SBC) into the analysis could provide new,
additional insight in the operation of local governments, which remained unexplored before.
The Hungarian example could also deliver valuable experiences to examine the changes in the
local government systems at international level.
The first Section of the paper briefly reviews the literature on SBCs, especially in respect of
the local government system. The pillars of the new local government system are shown in the
second Section, which is followed by formulating the hypotheses on the financial management of
the local governments. In Section 4, the hypotheses are verified, then conclusions are drawn.
2. THE SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT
The idea of SBC was formulated for the first time by Janos Kornai in a 1978 paper published in
Hungarian (‘Reproduction of Shortage’), then in his book entitled ‘Economics of Shortage’ (1980).
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In socialist systems, as Kornai argued, state-owned enterprises are not afraid of bankruptcy or
liquidation even in the event of loss-making operation. Their managers know that they will
survive difficulties as a result of help from the central government. Kornai et al. (2003) and
Kornai (2014) structure and summarise the problem of SBCs and the research in 25 and 35
years, respectively, since the ideas were formulated, which significantly widened the application
of the conceptual framework of the SBC: today the bailout of privately owned companies (e.g.
declining sectors) or certain operators in the financial sector no longer staggers anyone, espe-
cially in the knowledge of the events in the recent financial crisis. At the level of the national
economy, bailing out non-profit organisations (e.g. hospitals, schools, universities) and debt-
ridden, insolvent local governments is common. This study focuses on the latter phenomenon,
for which it is essential to describe the theory of the SBC in more detail.
In general, we can talk about the phenomenon of SBCs if ‘the behaviour of every organi-
zation concerned is affected by the expectation that it will be bailed out if it gets into serious
financial trouble’ (Kornai 2014: 27). There are organisations subject to budget constraints, which
must cover their expenses from their initial assets and revenues. In the present case, these or-
ganisations are local governments. The difference between revenues and expenses (deficit) may
be covered by a ‘support organisation’, in the present case, the central government. The phe-
nomenon of SBC arises when the financial decisions of local governments are determined by the
expectation that they will be bailed out if they get into serious financial trouble.
In the case of local governments, the hardness of the budget constraint is related to the extent of
fiscal decentralisation. In the course of fiscal decentralisation, the performance of public service tasks
is divided between the central government and the subnational levels; in accordance with the principle
of subsidiarity, decisions move closer to residents, and local needs become easier to meet, while locally
elected representatives and bodies become more accountable. However, in addition to its advantages,
this division of tasks also includes challenges. The principle of economies of scale may be infringed,
while it may be more difficult for the central government to look after its stabilisation tasks, and the
performance of subnational levels of government may pose a risk to government deficit and debt; the
latter are critical especially if such performance indicators are set for the entire national economy, as
the Maastricht criteria (Dafflon 2010). Thus, decisions made by the municipal leaders may be
significantly influenced by the expansion drive, i.e. to be able to provide as good public services and as
many projects to their residents as possible; this encourages them to overspend until they hit barriers.
Kornai (2014) explains that in some of the cases cautiousness and self-control may also be limiting
factors, but in most cases, restrictions come from outside, e.g. withdrawal of market operators and
closing of credit sources, while they may also include legislation or administrative tools restricting
expenditures or borrowing. In the decentralised countries, the reason for overspending by local
governments is that they are more inclined to assign higher priority to their own local interests than
to the interests of the country, the entire community. Importantly, Inman (2003) already raised the
point that passing through the costs can be interpreted not only in space, but also in time: if current
expenditures are covered by credit, different generations enjoy the benefits and will bear the burdens.
In the case of local governments, we can talk about serious financial trouble when the state of
insolvency is permanent and they have cumulative (operating) deficits for several years, are
unable to make instalment payments or just cannot get another loan, because they have lost their
creditworthiness. Regarding the frequency of financial trouble, bailouts can take place once,
repeatedly or regularly. Bailout may mean the cancellation of tax arrears, the easement of the
terms of repayment, the cancellation/assumption of debt or even the provision of fresh loans.
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Rodden et al. (2003) showed the mechanism of the SBC as a three-step sequential game. The
central government can be of two types: it supports bailout or distances itself from it. Local
governments individually evaluate the probability of commitment by the central government. In
the first step, the central government sets a framework for the financing and financial man-
agement of local governments and also declares that there will be no bailout and emphasises the
responsibility of local governments for their own financial management. In the second step, local
governments analyse the authenticity of the declarations and commitment of the central gov-
ernment. Based on this, they may decide to manage their finances within the given framework
and in accordance with the specific rules; in this case, the game is over. If, however, they decide
to overspend, they may request for additional support to be provided, or their existing debts be
assumed. In the final step, the central government decides on the basis of the costs and con-
sequences whether to bail out the local government or distances itself from any bailout.
The key question is motivation: what can encourage the central government to bail out a local
government? The SBC is a question of commitment in the relationship between local governments
and the central government: if a local government gets into financial trouble, will the central gov-
ernment provide it additional support or will it let the local government eliminate the problem itself?
It makes the decision more difficult as the central government often does not have sufficient infor-
mation about whether the local government managed its finances well and got into financial trouble
through no fault of its own or it results from deliberate overspending. The bailout of local govern-
ments can be explained by a number of reasons: the bankruptcy of individual local governments may
involve significant negative externalities in the performance of public service tasks and in the
employment of public service employees. At the same time, the insolvency of a large local government
may also affect the credit rating of the country, while the performance of the local governments may
worsen consolidated state budget indicators (deficit and debt). It may further strengthen the moti-
vation of the central government for a bailout if the statutory framework does not protect private
property and if credit agreements are not enforceable: in this case, the central government may
compensate creditors with a bailout. If financial trouble appears in very large numbers, due to the
intensification of social tensions, the political forces may lose their popularity at local and/or central
government level: thus, a bailout may be justified by political survival and vote maximisation (Kornai
2014). Robinson – Torvik (2009) apply the premise that the SBC is not only one of the effects of fiscal
decentralisation that politicians would get rid of (if they were credibly able to do so), but the central
government consciously aims to maintain the softness of the budget constraint, because the SBC is
suitable for building political clientelism: the recurrence of getting into trouble and bailout tightens
the patron-client relationship. This is confirmed by Fink – Stratman’s (2009) research, which shows in
an example from Germany that budget constraints are not uniformly soft for every local government:
the softness of the budget constraint depends on the bargaining power of individual local govern-
ments. As a result, influential local governments have a higher deficit and do not follow a tight fiscal
policy.1 Wildasin (1997) explains that the probability of bailouts increases in proportion to the size of
municipalities, i.e. the budget constraints on smaller local governments are harder. The reason for this
is that the external effects of larger local governments going bankrupt are higher andmay significantly
1Goodspeed’s (2002) conclusions go further: for the central government, it would be worth bailing out opposition local
governments in order to get votes and become re-elected. In this respect, Robinson – Torvik (2009) draws the
conclusion that it is more rewarding for decision-makers to embrace bad projects, because this way they can provide
funds to their supporters through a bailout. This is not true in the case of good projects, ‘everyone can back them’.
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exceed the costs of a bailout (‘too big to fail’). Therefore, Wildasin comes to the conclusion that the
reason for SBCs is not excessive decentralisation, but its low level: it would be desirable to break up
larger municipal units into smaller ones in order to harden the budget constraint.
We could see that the SBC prevalent in the financial management of local governments is a very
challenging feature arising from fiscal decentralisation, the main disadvantage of which is that it
encourages wanton spending at the expense of others. Local governments may provide public
services and launch projects irresponsibly, without those being covered by their budgets. If the
expectation of the local government for a bailout is strong enough, it may lead to significant
overspending, which makes it impossible to refuse a bailout. In an extreme case, a moral hazard
also appears: if the local government knows that it can certainly count on being rescued by the state,
it is not worth of making any effort to avoid losses or to repay a loan; in fact, it may even keep on
increasing its expenditures (Kornai 1993). In addition, the SBC also affects the preference of de-
cision-makers: the operation and development of the organisation may be relegated to the back-
ground, while the establishment of relations with potential bailout providers may receive more
attention. At the same time, Besfamille – Lockwood (2007) explain that by contrast a hard budget
constraint may cause a setback in projects; moreover, the local governments have to make a
disproportionate sacrifice to filter out bad projects, which leads to inefficiency.
What means can be used to decrease or even eliminate the effects of the SBC? According to
Rodden – Eskeland’s (2003) approach, a SBC develops if the central government proves to be too
vulnerable to the financial processes or perhaps crisis arising at the municipal level, and at the same
time it is too weak or deliberately does not take action to prevent overspending by administrative
and regulatory tools. Besfamille – Lockwood (2007) see two ways to eliminate the SBC: in the top-
down approach, the central government establishes a hard budget constraint by ‘hierarchical
mechanisms’. By contrast, according to the bottom-up approach (‘unconstrained decentralization’),
fiscal discipline emerges as a result of (self-) assessment by the local governments and the restrictive
power of market mechanisms harden the budget constraint; to this end, the central government
must successfully distance itself from the local government system and, at the same time, must also
reduce its internal vulnerability (Fig. 1). These two methods are presented in detail.
Bailouts and soft budget 
constraint
Fig. 1. Dimensions of intergovernmental relations2
Source: Rodden – Eskeland (2003).
2The figure of Rodden-Eskeland (2003) also includes one additional dimension (the financial strength of the central
government), which is omitted here: we presented only the case when the central government is fiscally strong.
Otherwise weakness in this manner would mean sovereignty at municipal level.
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2.1. Establishment of fiscal discipline
To strengthen the fiscal discipline, the central government may strengthen market mechanisms
to enable them to control the financial management of local governments themselves. According
to Kornai (1993), this requires the achievement of the following pillars: (1) customer: pay for the
goods purchased; (2) debtor: perform your credit agreement and repay your debt; (3) taxpayer: pay
your tax and (4) company/local government: cover your costs from your revenues. If financial
trouble occurs, this approach may also entail abandoning certain local governments. With this,
the central government may demonstrate that it will not assume liability for municipal debts.
Although this may lead to bankruptcy, it may encourage the local governments and market
operators to be cautious in the future.
Other institutions and laws can clarify ex ante what procedure is expected in the event of the
insolvency of a local government. This goal is served by, e.g. setting clear rules for the settlement
of bankruptcy and debts of local governments; these procedures take place independently of the
central government, which may guarantee that market mechanisms will control the financial
management of local governments in the long term. According to Ter-Minassian – Craig (1997),
essential conditions for this are the free market and the fact that same or similar regulations
should apply to the local governments as to other market operators. It is necessary, furthermore,
to ensure the availability of the necessary information for debtor rating (in particular, on
outstanding debts and the ability to repay debts) and that local governments have guarantees
that support a responsible budgetary policy (own control mechanisms). Last but not the least, it
is essential that market operators do not expect any bailout.
2.2. Administrative strengthening of the budget constraint
In order to strengthen the credibility and commitment of the central government, a number of
administrative tools may be at its disposal in order to enable it to avoid overspending and
concomitant excessive indebtedness. The use of these methods may make budget constraints
harder; however, with this there is a risk that local governments will take a subordinate role.
Rodden et al. (2003) classify and characterise the available means as follows:
 Prohibition of borrowing and central coordination of the allocation of external funds. Means
for this may be the maximisation of municipal debt levels, the approval of loan applications or
even the total centralisation of municipal borrowing. Its advantage is that the development of
municipal debt will be brought into line with macroeconomic efforts and vulnerability will be
reduced. However, with this, the central government may acquire excessive influence in the
decisions taken by the local governments. In addition, with the central approval of borrowing,
the local governments may think that responsibility now lies with the central government, so
they may rightly expect help and a bailout in the event of financial trouble (Ter-Minassian –
Craig 1997). This may undermine the politically neutral efforts of the central government
refusing any bailout in the future. In the view of Rodden et al. (2003), credit allocation and
loan restriction mechanisms are often politicised and, therefore, do not work in practice.
However, the restricted condition, i.e. making the conditions of borrowing more stringent,
may significantly set back projects, because they may be financed only from current surplus or
savings (see also Besfamille – Lockwood 2007). The financing needs of projects appearing
concentrated in time may unfairly burden the generations that finance their implementation
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or, without credit, the projects are postponed. This may be offset if the central government
provides development funds or implements local projects itself; however, this may infringe
the competence and autonomy of the local governments (Dafflon 2010).
 Rule-based mechanisms may limit the purpose and extent of borrowing: e.g. long-term funds
may finance only projects or if the indebtedness and the annual debt service may not exceed a
certain level. This includes also budget regulations, e.g. no deficit may be planned in the
budget. Such a widespread set of conditions is the ‘golden rule’, which allows debt financing:
this increases the autonomy of the local governments, allows more projects and ensures a fair
distribution of financing burdens between generations (pay-as-you-use). The golden rule re-
quires that (1) current expenditure may be covered only from current revenue (no operating
deficit is allowed); (2) projects may be financed from loans and (3) the debt service may be
covered by current income (no erosion of assets and debt spiral). Since the golden rule does
not limit the allowable rate of borrowing, it may become necessary to apply separate rules for
the rate of absolute or relative indebtedness (Dafflon 2010).
 If the central government decides to proceed with a bailout instead of releasing the hands of local
governments, it may set certain conditions (at the municipal or sectoral level) in order to
eliminate the root cause of the financial trouble. This allows institutional reform and may
confirm that no bailout will take place in the future; thus, market operators and decision-makers
can see that a new era sets in in the relationship between the local governments and the central
government. Dietrichson – Ellegard (2012) studied the short- and long-term effects of condi-
tional bailouts carried out in connection with 36 local governments in Sweden between 2000 and
2004. It was found that financial assistance made subject to the fulfilment of conditions (cost
reduction and operating budget balance) did not erode fiscal discipline, in fact, it even
strengthened it. Based on the results, they also venture to propose that financial assistance made
subject to conditions is more effective in strengthening fiscal discipline than the application of a
hard(er) budget constraint. The Dutch model must also be mentioned (Allers 2014): in this case,
the loss or debt of local governments is backed by the explicit guarantee of the central gov-
ernment: if necessary, local governments will be bailed out. Nevertheless, the number of bailouts
per year is quite low (2–4 per year between 2001 and 2014, involving less than 1% of the local
governments). The main reason for this is, according to the author, that autonomy of the local
government is significantly curtailed during the 3- or 4-years period of bailouts. The financial
situation of local governments typically improves after bailouts.
We have seen that the establishment of fiscal discipline is a more sluggish process than using
central administrative tools to control financial management and strengthen the budget
constraint. On the other hand, as the corresponding literature points out, the latter may inflict
serious wounds upon local autonomy. Conditional bailouts, however, may have a positive effect
on the development of fiscal discipline in the long run.
3. CONSOLIDATION AND THE NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM
The central government set to transform public administration in Hungary in 2011 at a great
pace. This paper covers only the changes in the sectoral budget constraint and in the rules of
financial management. It discusses the main features of the consolidation between 2011 and
2014, then the new local government system is presented briefly.
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3.1. Municipal debt assumption
There is a broad consensus that the budget constraint of the local governments in Hungary has
remained soft even after the regime change in 1990. Despite the steps taken to push market
actors towards fiscal discipline in 1996 (e.g. enactment of a debt settlement procedure and
introduction of a borrowing limit), the general perception among local governments and
financing banks remained that the central government would not release the hands of local
governments (Gal 2011). Fiscal discipline could not emerge, mainly due to a design failure of the
institutions mentioned. First, the borrowing limits were ineffective and unenforceable (Homolya
– Szigel 2008). Second, the debt settlement procedure had several institutional weaknesses
(Bajnai et al. 2018; Gal 2011). Since 1996, less than a hundred bankruptcy procedures started,
which is an extraordinarily low figure compared to the number of local governments (approx.
3,200). No procedure was launched against the larger local governments, as it requires too much
sacrifice from all the parties concerned.3 On the one hand, only the mandatory tasks may be
performed and no project may be launched during the procedure, which would have significant
effects on the local economy and public services. On the other hand, the banks (being the largest
creditors) typically did not see the guarantee that they would achieve more in a long procedure,
involving many additional creditors, than in the bilateral negotiations. Since the debt settlement
procedure is not compulsory to launch, a number of local governments could have already gone
into latent bankruptcy; in their case, although the conditions for launching a debt settlement
procedure exist, the procedure is still not initiated; in the worst case, a bailout must come – so
went the thinking of both creditors and local governments (Homolya – Szigel 2008).
The weak institutional setting was further burdened by a number of independent things:4 the
excessive and continuous decentralisation of public service tasks; flexible budget boundaries
(erosion of assets, operations financed from long term loans) and internal indebtedness; bond
issues becoming widespread; an attempt to make the conditions of borrowing more stringent in
2007; the possibility of borrowing in foreign currency and the foreign exchange credit boom; the
municipal leaders’ moral responsibility (and the fact that the leadership of the majority of
important local governments was in the opposition between 2006 and 2010); the possibility of
off-balance sheet indebtedness (e.g. PPP or sureties); and last but not least the continuous
expansion drive.
As a result, an enormous debt pile was accumulated by the local governments in the period
between 2006 and 2010, and their deficit also rose to a peak level at that time. In 2011, the
central government with two-thirds majority initiated an unprecedentedly large bailout, which
confirmed the preliminary expectations on SBC: all debts of all local governments were generally
assumed in four phases. The process was completed by 2014. As expected, opinions were divided
as to whether a bailout action of such a scale was warranted (HUF 1,337 billion in total).5
According to Lentner (2014) and Molnar – Heged}us (2018), the debt assumption was inevitable
3The Hungarian case confirms Wildasin (1997) as only the small local governments (mostly villages) got under debt
settlement (the smaller a local government, the harder the budget constraint). Later it will be shown that those who may
have really needed help were the larger local governments; probably their expectations of a bailout were also higher.
4For a detailed explanation of the individual topics, see Vigvari 2009, 2010; Vasvari 2009, 2013b; Jankovics 2016; Schepp
– Pitz 2016; Kornai 1980, 2014.
5See Kornai (2014) for the details of the bail-out.
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and crucial for the continuous and sustainable operation of the local governments. Jankovics
(2016) and Horvath et al. (2014) argues that the general and full debt consolidation that took
place in Hungary had not been preceded by serious financial problems at the sector level. Thus,
in fact, this bailout can be considered a indirect transfer provided in a differentiated way, a
indirect transfer from the local governments and their residents who had no debt or had run
into debt below average.6 Kornai (2014) quantifies the extent of the ‘gift’, and also points out the
signs of political clientelism. The importance of a ‘sector level’ indicator cannot be sufficiently
stressed, because financial problems had arguably arisen among the local governments. Almost
all county governments became heavily indebted and, what is more, a large proportion of their
long-term debt had financed operating expenses (Vasvari 2013a). In this case, the central
government also assumed trade creditors. Local governments could also accumulate debt in a
foreign currency; and only transaction exchange losses resulted in an almost 15% (HUF 182
billion) increase in debt at the end of 2010 (which can be considered an unexpected external
financial shock). However, even then the weight of the outstanding debt of the local govern-
ments did not reach 5% of the GDP or 6% of government debt (the expenditure of the municipal
sector amounted to approximately 12.8% of the GDP at that time); and as Kornai (2014) points
out, 82.6% of this debt was accumulated by 150 local governments (4.7% of local governments).
As mentioned earlier, the municipal deficit also reached a record level in 2010, which thus
increased the government deficit by 25%. However, cities with county rank and districts of
Budapest, i.e. fewer than 50 local governments, are responsible for almost half of this deficit. In
addition, it is worth evaluating the bailout process also in the current economic policy space.
During the bailout, significant funds were withdrawn from the bank sector (e.g. transaction levy,
bank tax). Although the proportion of non-performing loans owed by the local governments was
only 2.1% in mid-2011 (Jankovics 2016), the repayment of a significant part of the municipal
debt would have only begun after 2011 (Vasvari 2013b). Therefore, the issue of municipal debt
could easily become subject to bargaining in the turbulent relationship between the banking
system and the central government. This confirms that the central government offered the last
phase of the bailout of the local governments first to the financing banks. In exchange for
assuming the remaining debt, the creditor should have paid an amount corresponding to 7% of
the debt part assumed to the state coffers. Although the idea was not implemented in the end,
the concrete proposals to be put before the municipal councils were also drafted in some cases.
In the knowledge of the above, targeted assistance provided subject to conditions at the level
of the individual local governments could seem to be justified. The decision-makers of the
central government chose another path and, by cancelling municipal debt, also relieved the local
governments from the responsibility.
3.2. Financial cornerstones of the new local government system
Simultaneously with assuming debts at the sector level, the central government was set to
transform the local government system. Even the Fundamental Law contains significant changes
in local self-governance. According to it, the law may make borrowing or other commitments by
6Although the central government provided a total of HUF 50 billion in aid through applications to the local govern-
ments that did not have any debt, but did not provide any compensation to those the indebtedness of which did not
reach the average level and consequently sustained detriment.
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local governments subject to the conditions of the consent of the Government in order to
maintain budgetary balance.
The foundations of the new local government system are set out in the supermajority law on
the local governments of Hungary. A significant trend of centralisation can be observed in the
division of tasks: county governments essentially no longer perform public service tasks, while
such tasks have been withdrawn from local governments to a significant extent (e.g. education,
health care). In addition, the financial latitude of the local governments has narrowed even
further due to the introduction of a ‘task financing system’ (Sivak et al. 2013). As one of the most
important changes, the Law declares that no externally financed operating deficit may be
planned in budgets.
The new Act literally repeats the promise also included in the earlier Local Government Act,
according to which ‘the consequences of the loss-making financial management of the local gov-
ernment burden the same local government and the central budget is not responsible for its liabilities.’
In line with the authorisation granted in the Fundamental Law, the Economic Stability Act
contains the rules for local government borrowing. It requires, above all, the fulfilment of certain
convergence criteria for government budget deficit and the government debt indicator; in
connection with the latter, since the government debt indicator exceeds the required 60% (74.5%
at the end of 2017), it requires to be reduced. Since municipal debt is a part of government debt,
the latter requirement also provides a framework for the municipal borrowing. The most
important change is that from 1 January 2012 the local governments may validly conclude
transactions giving rise to a debt and may assume any surety or guarantee only with the prior
consent of the central government. According to the Act, the central government consents to
borrowing only if the following conditions are met jointly:
1. the transaction giving rise to a debt does not jeopardise the achievement of the general
government debt ratio specified in the Central State Budget Act;
2. the transaction giving rise to a debt results in the establishment of a capacity required for
performing the task of the local government specified by law, with the proviso that operating
expenses are continuously covered;
3. it has introduced local business tax or at least one of the pecuniary taxes specified in the Local
Tax Act or the communal taxes on private individuals; and
4. it is within the borrowing limit (generally the total payment obligation of the local government
arising from a transaction may not exceed 50% of the local government’s own revenues).
Rodden – Eskeland (2003) draw attention to the fact that local governments tend to avoid
rule-based mechanisms. The amendments of the acts closed these back doors gradually. Such
was the amendment of existing contracts (e.g. changing the term of loan or the terms of maturity
or principal repayment grace period) or running into debt through municipally owned com-
panies. Even contract amendments have become subject to authorisation by now. The growth of
municipal debt through municipally owned companies was first limited by the assumption of
sureties and guarantees by local governments, then from 2015 by making borrowing by 100%
municipally owned companies subject to authorisation. This was also justified by the fact that
according to the Ministry of Interior the growth of municipal debt shifted to entirely or partially
municipally owned companies, where an outstanding debt of more than HUF 1,000 billion was
accumulated. This is an amount of the same magnitude as that assumed by the central gov-
ernment from the local governments.
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All transactions giving rise to a debt, which are planned in the given year, have to be included
in their by-laws on the budget and the central government has to be informed about it in
advance. Then the request for the consent of the central government must be drawn up for each
transaction during the year. The Government decides on approval on the basis of the joint
proposal and recommendation of the Minister responsible for local governments and the
Minister responsible for the state budget. The Government may also consent to part of the
individual transactions or may even refuse them. In the light of the development goals, a de-
cision may be made which contributes an amount lower than planned by the local government
to the related transaction. Upon approval, the transaction giving rise to the debt or the sure-
tyship agreement has to be concluded in the reference year.
Last but not the least, it is necessary to mention that the transformation of the local gov-
ernment sector did not affect the review of the municipal debt settlement procedure, so the rules
for the municipal debt settlement procedure set in 1996 and largely unchanged ever since did
not change during the reform. According to Bajnai et al. (2018), 559 local governments fulfiled
the criteria of debt settlement procedure between 2012 and 2016, however, the procedure was
initiated in 45 cases only (less than 10%).
The new legislative environment continues not to deal with the issue of the internal
indebtedness, i.e. depreciation not made up for. This is critical in the Hungarian local gov-
ernment system particularly because the local governments inherited substantial assets at the
time of the regime change, for the maintenance/replacement of which no funds were provided
(in 2016 the portfolio of municipal real estate was worth more than HUF 10,000 billion, about
two-thirds of which was unalienable national asset). On the positive side, in addition to a cash
flow-based approach, the local governments have performed accrual-based accounting since
2014, which, in addition to the fact that it may improve the evaluability of the economic pro-
cesses of the local governments and the assessment of their creditworthiness for external fi-
nanciers, also states depreciation as a cost.
3.3. Evaluation
In order to eliminate the phenomenon of SBCs and to strengthen the budget constraint, the central
government chose a conditional bailout: in addition to a bailout, it hardened the budget constraint
by administrative tools.7 In accordance with the recommendations in the literature, local govern-
ments may no longer plan operating deficit; however, this only applies to externally financed deficits,
as operating deficits financed from asset disposals continue to be permitted. Task financing and the
method of the calculation of central aid reduced the latitude of local governments, and last but not
the least their interest to improve efficiency. As a rule, borrowing is to be approved by the central
government or even the Government itself. Consequently, there may be local governments that
forfeit the opportunity of borrowing notwithstanding that they have met the prescribed conditions.
This may significantly affect the level of municipal projects, and they may become
defenceless to the intentions of the central government (Rodden 2003 and Dafflon 2010). The
7According to Horvath (2014), cause and effect are inverted: the incorrect suggestion of a crisis and the inevitability of
intervention are to serve the ‘smoothness’ of the transformation of the sector. So, the withdrawal of the tasks appeared to
be more justified with reference to the inevitability of crisis management. In fact, the centralisation efforts of the central
government found their way easier between municipal decision-makers, without any resistance. As a result of all this,
institution-based municipal autonomy, which was held responsible for everything, was eliminated.
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exclusive authorisation right of the government may also be a problem: since the Government
and its administration are not prepared to assess credit risks, they may reject good projects in
the absence of knowledge and information, while they may authorise projects that are not
financially justifiable. With this, the Government may assume excessive responsibility (Sivak
et al. 2013); at the same time, the authorisation of the Government can also be interpreted as a
kind of implicit guarantee. This is further reinforced by the communication factor that the
position taken by the central government, which refuses bailout, is identical, word for word, with
its previous promise – which it obviously failed to honour once.
The strict control presented above is further supported by the facelifted borrowing criteria,
which now mostly satisfy the conditions of the golden rule. The new version of the calculated
borrowing limit also shows development compared to its predecessor in several points (e.g. it has to
be met throughout the loan term, not only in the year of borrowing). It is a positive feature that the
new regulations deal with the issue of off-balance sheet indebtedness and the increasing indebt-
edness of the municipally owned companies. Consequently, running into debt may also be put on a
more sustainable path, however, the borrowing criteria along with the central approval mechanism
represent a – perhaps unnecessary – double defence line to avoid unleashed borrowing.
Due to the above measurements, the financial management of local governments has
consolidated in the new legislative environment (Fig. 2). Between 2013 and 2016, reflecting the
operation of the new local government system, the budgetary expenditures dropped to about
two-thirds of the 2010 level, while the outstanding debt virtually disappeared by 2014 as a result
of debt consolidation and shows only a slight increase. The positive news is that budgets are also
consolidated: after 2011 they became balanced.
The central government chose to use administrative mechanisms to control the financial
management of local governments and avoid any negative effects of the bailout. To this end, it
implemented new institutions and processes. The former institutional setting was partly updated
accordingly (borrowing criteria), however, these updates seem weightless in the new system. A
system restricting the latitude of local governments (and thus their autonomy) by administrative
means has been established; the budget constraint is seemingly hard, but may carry the pos-
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Fig. 2. The budget, debt and deficit of Hungarian local governments, 2000–2016
Source: Based on figures from the HCSO and the National Bank of Hungary.
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self-restriction or the restrictive power of the market (e.g. review of the debt settlement pro-
cedure), except for the introduction of accrual-based accounting.
4. HYPOTHESES AND THE APPLIED METHODOLOGY
The previous section introduced the new local government system – especially from the financial
management aspect, while the first section reviewed the concept of SBC. In this section, we
formulate two hypotheses on the consequences of the changes in the local government.
Rodden et al. (2003), Besfamille – Lockwood (2007) and Dafflon (2010) conclude that due to
the increase of administrative controls over the municipal financial management, the level of
municipal projects could drop. Thus, the second hypothesis is that the administrative
strengthening of the budget constraint has a negative effect on municipal projects (H1).
Rodden et al. (2003) also point out that the credit allocation and loan restriction mechanisms
driven by the central government are often politicised. Kornai (2014) verified that the debt
assumption of the local governments clearly showed political patterns. In the second hypothesis
we assume when borrowing is authorised, patterns may appear, showing that political sympathy
plays a role in the individual decisions (H2).
For the verification we used simple, descriptive statistical and illustrative tools, and for the first
hypotheses I examined the aggregate datasets of the local governments, mainly from the Hungarian
Central Statistical Office (HCSO). For the second hypothesis I analysed all decisions on borrowing by
the local governments issued between 2012 and 2017 and arranged them in a database. A total of 50
government resolutions included 716 decisions to examine. To check political affiliation, it was
assigned to local governments in the database whether the mayor had been nominated by the ruling
parties or an opposition party or entered the elections as an independent candidate of another party
in the given government cycle based on the data of the National Election Office. Later, I expanded the
analysis to explore the reasons for rejection, as they are not indicated in the government resolutions: it
is attempted to verify whether the financial situation of the local governments and the rejection
correlate, or not. For this, we analysed the fulfilment of the objective borrowing criteria (see previous
section) of each transaction and the local governments concerned. These criteria are as follows:
- the transaction is related to the performance of a statutory task (according to the government
resolutions),
- the levied taxes (based on Tax online database),
- the existence of the operating capacities, which was assumed in the case of local governments
where the operating budget had been balanced, and
- the compliance with the debt rule, where the debt service of the new transaction was
compared to the borrowing limit of the local governments concerned; latter was calculated on
the basis of the statutory revenues and the debt service in the given year (without taking into
account the charges relating to the new transaction).
The latter two criteria are verified through analysing the corresponding annual budget re-
ports of the local governments, which was provided by the Hungarian State Treasury.
Fig. 3 illustrates the connection between the hypotheses, the applied methodology and the
corresponding literature.
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5. THE NEW LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN PRACTICE
This section will analyse the practical experiences of the new legislative environment through
verifying the two hypotheses formulated in the previous section.
H1: The administrative strengthening of the budget constraint has a negative effect on municipal
projects.
According to Vigvari (2011), fiscal discipline and the borrowing activities of the local
governments are of special significance because the greater part of the public projects are
implemented by the local governments. This is also justified by the principle of subsidiarity. In
the majority of the EU-27 countries, including Hungary, the share of local governments in
public projects was close to or over 50%. The latter is well illustrated in Fig. 4. However, the
trend seen between 2000 and 2010 was broken: the weight of the local governments in public
projects have dropped to a level lower by orders of magnitude from 2011, due to the significant
increase of government projects. In 2016, the local governments implemented less than a
quarter of public projects. However, also the schedule of drawing down aid from the European
Union could have significant impact on the level of investments. In this respect, it can be said
that between 2010 and 2015, the amounts drawn down increased by 75%, but a major (45%)
decline took place in the last year. As a result, the total amount drawn down fell to the 2010
level. This means that the setback in municipal projects was caused between 2010 and 2016 by
a decrease in projects financed not from EU aid but from the local government’s own funds
and credit sources.8
According to Rodden et al. (2003) and Dafflon (2010), with the decline in municipal
projects, the influence of the central government on local projects may increase. This trend is
confirmed in the example of Hungary: the central government has implemented and still
implements to date a number of development programmes satisfying local interests.9 This has
three main consequences: firstly, the autonomy of the local governments obviously decreases
and they are at the mercy of central decisions.10 Secondly, there is a possibility that the
central government makes its decisions on the basis of political sympathy or lobbying, which
places the municipalities left out at a disadvantage. Thirdly, these projects do not require that
the operating expenses of the capacities implemented with the project be ensured (which is
incidentally required by the central government in projects implemented through borrowing
by local governments). This can lead to a conflict as to who should operate the new facilities
established or from what funds their condition will be preserved, as it already have happened
in Hungary.
On the basis of the above, hypothesis H1 is accepted: the number of municipal projects
significantly decreased; at the same time, we are witnessing a significant increase in the role of
8Vasvari (2013a) shows that EU financing did not dominate yet in the financing of municipal projects until 2010.
9For example the Modern Cities Programme, under which the central government entered into an agreement with the 23
largest cities in the provinces for the implementation of development objectives in a total value of HUF 3,388 billion.
10For example the Mayor of Szombathely (a city with county rank and a population of 78 thousand) declared at the
inauguration ceremony of the football stadium built in the city as a government project that they had obviously
received this gift, ‘because they had behaved properly’. We can recall Kornai’s (1980) words: ‘The need for projects is
not limited by fear from loss or failure. (. . .) Projects are gifts to the applicants.’
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the central government in local projects, which may cause the decline of municipal autonomy
and discrimination against certain local governments.
H2: When borrowing is authorised, patterns may appear, showing that political sympathy plays
a role in the individual decisions.
First, the distribution of applications for the central approval of borrowing is examined
(Table 1). Based on this, it can be said that 47.3% of the applications were submitted by the local
governments led by mayors affiliated with the governing party; in respect of the loan amounts,
this represents a weight over 85.6%. 4.8% of the applications can be associated with munici-
palities affiliated with the opposition, which is considerably lower than the figure observed for
the ruling party but is higher than the proportion of the local governments led by them (1.6%).
47.9% of the applications were submitted by independent local governments, but in terms of
value this corresponds to only 10%. The reason for this is that the national political parties enter
candidates typically in larger municipalities, the budget and borrowing capacity are much larger
than those of smaller villages typically led by the independent mayors.
Table 1 essentially shows demand for municipal loans on the basis of political affiliation. The
extent of the demand for loans before the reform and consolidation is simply estimated with the
outstanding to be consolidated. According to the order shown in Table 1, this is 71, 7 and 22%,
respectively (Kornai 2014). Consequently, it can be established that the intention of the inde-
pendent-led local governments to borrow has declined significantly. This may mean a decline in
borrowing by smaller towns and villages, which may be caused by these local governments not
fulfiling the borrowing rules, or these smaller local governments are not found creditworthy as a
result of the more cautious lending policy of banks. The significant administrative burden of the
procedure may be also deterrent.
Examining the decisions (Table 2), it can be said that while the central government approves
89.1% of the applications, it approves less than 70% of the applications associated with oppo-
sition parties. The Cramer coefficient (0.17), however, anticipates weak relationship between the
political affiliation and the approval rate. The distribution of the volume approved shows greater
HUF billion
Fig. 4. Accumulation of gross fixed assets by the central government and local governments in Hungary,
2000–2016
Source: Based on figures from the HCSO.
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differences: in this respect, local governments affiliated with opposition parties received approval
only for less than half of the loan amounts they wanted to borrow. This is also confirmed by the
corresponding Cramer coefficient (0.41), based on which moderate relationship is assumed.
The reason for this, however, is not necessarily a political bias: it is conceivable that the
opposition local governments are in a fundamentally worse budgetary situation (e.g. this can
also justify the opposition leadership), and the objective conditions are not met during
borrowing. Since the reason for rejection is not indicated in the government resolutions, we
attempted to verify if the budgetary situation correlates with the rejection of the applications.
The analysis is based on the objective borrowing criteria set by the Law:
- the transaction is related to the performance of a statutory task;
- the local government has imposed the local taxes established by law;
- the continuous payment for operating expenditure is ensured; and
- the municipal debt rule is fulfiled.
Table 2. Approval rate of borrowing applications by political affiliation
Political affiliation
Number of applications
Amount stated in the application (HUF
billion)
Approved Rejected Approval rate, % Approved Rejected Approval rate, %
Governing party 314 25 92.6 324.8 16.2 95.2
Opposition 23 11 67.6 7.9 9.6 45.0
Independent/Other 301 42 87.8 28.8 11.2 71.9
Total 638 78 89.1 361.5 37.0 90.7
Source: Based on figures from government resolutions and the National Election Office.
Table 1. National distribution of borrowing applications and the status of mayors by political affiliation
Political affiliation





amount stated in the
application
Local government % Pcs % HUF billion %
Governing party 627 19.8 339 47.3 341 85.6
Opposition 51 1.6 34 4.8 17.5 4.4
Independent/Other 2,485 78.6 343 47.9 40 10.0
Total 3,163 100.0 716 100.0 398.5 100.0
Source: Based on figures from government resolutions and the National Election Office.
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According to the analysis, it can be concluded that all transactions were related to the tasks of
local governments and the local governments did impose the taxes required for borrowing. The
results on the latter two criteria are shown in Table 3. It can be established that the transactions
associated with the opposition perform better according to both considerations: there was an
operating deficit in one case, while the debt rule was not fulfiled in four cases. The worse-than-
average situation of independent local governments, as previously noted, may be caused by a
smaller municipality size, which may also play a role in access to credit sources. Based on this, it
can be assumed that the refusal of borrowing by local governments affiliated with the opposition
is not affected by the financial situation of the local governments.
Consequently, hypothesis H2 is accepted: signs of political clientelism can be found in
central government approval of borrowing between 2012 and 2017. In addition, it was shown
that access to credit sources by smaller municipalities was limited in the new legislative envi-
ronment.
6. CONCLUSIONS
One of the biggest challenges of fiscal decentralization is the handling of the SBC. With the help
of the literature, it was pointed out that during the hardening of the budget constraint two main
approaches could be applied: the restriction of financial management and access to external
funds by administrative tools or the strengthening of the fiscal discipline of local governments.
In the case of the former, the vulnerability of the central government may decrease and the
financial management of local governments may become consolidated in the short term; at the
same time, it may result in a significant curtailment of municipal autonomy. The establishment
of fiscal discipline is a longer process because it requires a change in the behaviour and deeply
ingrained expectations of market operators.










Proportion of those not
fulfiling the rule, %
Governing
party
65 274 19.2 75 264 22.1
Opposition 1 33 2.9 4 30 11.8
Independent/
Other
94 249 27.4 67 276 19.5
Total 160 556 22.3 146 570 20.4
Source: Based on figures from government resolutions, the Hungarian State Treasury and the National Election
Office.
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The bailout process of the local governments in Hungary between 2011 and 2014 was briefly
reviewed. It is argued that a, general and full bailout was not justified due to the concentrated
nature of the problems. At the same time, it may provide a special interpretation of the
events if they are evaluated in the relationship between the financial sector and the central
government. Simultaneously with the bailout, the central government decided to strengthen
its control over the local governments, neglecting fiscal discipline. A few positive changes
can be observed in the new statutory system (e.g. restrictions on operating balance, new
borrowing limit, accrual-based accounting). However, the approval of loans by the central
government (in fact, directly by the Government) projects a substantial reduction of access
to external funds, which may also affect the level of projects, assuming, at the same time, an
implicit guarantee for approved loans. Moreover, the central government kept several rules
and processes from the previous municipal system which may seem unnecessary under the
present conditions.
Following the reform, the financial management of the local governments became consoli-
dated, the fulfilment of the relevant convergence criteria was not jeopardised by the financial
management of local governments and the vulnerability of the central government decreased. At
the same time, there was a significant setback in municipal projects and projects promoted by
the central government and serving local interests try to fill this void, which may inflict sig-
nificant wounds on municipal autonomy. Furthermore, the new system significantly limits
access to external funds, mainly by smaller municipalities, which is aggravated by the fact that
loan approval applications are not free from political affiliation. It is concluded that although the
strict rules are the same for all local governments, the central government employs specific
administrative tools to show favour to some settlements according to its (political) interests.
Accordingly, the institution of political clientelism that is a feature of the SBC is still alive and
well in the era of strict central controls and hard budget constraint. By giving up a significant
part of their autonomy, local authorities paid a too high price for getting rid of their debt
burdens. Nevertheless, the SBC remained in place: its textbook example at hand is the city of
Pecs (the fourth largest city after Budapest in Hungary with a population of 145,000), which
already requested bailout in the middle of 2017. However, this time the central government
picked up the gauntlet and set strict conditions for another bailout. This deterrent example may
represent a shift towards establishing fiscal discipline for the local governments, in line with the
findings of Dietrichson – Ellegard (2012) and Allers (2014).
Based on these findings, it is recommended to strengthen the fiscal discipline in order to
dismantle the SBC. First, the appropriate institutions have to be put in place (e.g. review of the
debt settlement procedure). Afterwards, the hierarchical mechanisms have to be gradually
eliminated. Together with the restoration of the autonomy of local communities, it is necessary
to return local projects to the local governments.
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